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PREFACE
Phillip L Blumberg*
Anglo-American corporation law has traditionally been bottomed
upon the concept that each corporation, like each human being, is a
separate juridical person with its own legal rights and duties; this is entity
law. This doctrine arose centuries ago and was well suited to deal with the
needs of a simpler economic society. It was a time when corporations
generally could not own other corporations, and corporate groups with
holding companies or parent corporations were unknown. At that time,
each corporation was a separate economic enterprise as well as a separate
legal entity. This is no longer the case.
Over the centuries, the economy has dramatically changed. In the
modem world, giant multinational enterprises with multi-tiered corporate
structures dominate the economy and conduct worldwide businesses
through numerous subsidiaries. Investors look upon each multinational as
a separate corporate enterprise. However, the traditional corporate law
sees only the scores or hundreds of separate corporations in the group,
each with its own rights and duties. The traditional law, thus, ignores the
economic reality that the subsidiaries are not acting as separate,
independent businesses. Instead, they are collectively conducting a
common business under the control of their parent corporation.
In this manner, the traditional corporation law constitutes a substantial
barrier to the imposition of liability upon the parent corporation and the
group by reason of the activities of a subsidiary. Although it is a barrier,
the subsidiary's activities arise in the conduct of the common enterprise
for the benefit of the enterprise and typically under the common public
persona of the enterprise. In this manner, the assets of the enterprise are
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not available for the payment of all the liabilities of the enterprise. The
companies in each layer of the multi-tiered group are insulated from the
liabilities of each other and from the liabilities of all companies in lower
tiers in the complex corporate structure. The traditional law results in
successive limitations of liability.
It should be evident that insofar as corporate groups are concerned,
the expansive limited liability provided under these circumstances goes far
beyond the insulation of liability of the public shareholders of the parent
corporation. The traditional corporation law, thus, represents a
dramatically excessive response to the limited liability problem.
Reflecting these factors, the American law has in many areas found
automatic application of the traditional doctrine unacceptable. In order to
be able to implement better the underlying objectives and policies of the
area of law in issue, courts and legislatures have turned to other
approaches permitting the adoption of enterprise principles and the
imposition of liability for subsidiary action upon the parent and the group.
Of these, the doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" is the most
prominent of the routes available for courts to escape the severe
restrictions of entity law and impose liability upon the enterprise.
However, "piercing" is a creature of equity jurisprudence with rigorous
requirements and many difficulties in its application. It was designed for
the resolution of private controversies at a time when each corporation
was in most cases still a separate enterprise as well as a separate entity.
The issue was whether the investor-shareholder as well as the corporation
was to be liable for the tort or contract of the corporation. It is ill-suited
for dealing with the problems presented by large corporate groups. In
these cases, the issue is the liability of the parent corporation for the
obligations of its subsidiaries; imposition of liabilities on the public
shareholders of the parent corporation, who are the investors in today's
large enterprises, does not arise at all.
Statutory law, not judge-made enterprise law, represents the greatest
triumph of enterprise principles in American law. Until 1933, American
statutory regulatory law proceeded exclusively in reliance on traditional
corporation law that looks upon each corporation as a separate legal entity.
By 1933, it had become evident that "piercing" was a highly ineffective
judicial response when the government sought to prevent widespread
evasion of statutory objectives by sophisticated manipulation of the
corporate structure. Entity law proved too high a barrier to effective social
and economic regulation.
In the New Deal reform legislation, the Congress, accordingly, no
longer drafted major regulatory statutes in the traditional entity law terms
that had proved so ineffective. Turning to enterprise principles and the
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concept of "control", the Congress expressly expanded the scope of the
most important statutory programs of the period to include not only the
regulated company but its "controlling" corporations and often
corporations under its "common control", "affiliates", and other
"insiders". Through this highly effective technique, regulatory programs
for the first time included all companies in the corporate group and,
thereby, reached the entire economic enterprise.
This wave of New Deal legislation and subsequent statutory law
accomplished a veritable revolution in American law. It included the great
statutes regulating such key industries as the railroads, securities, banking,
savings and loan, investment, and utility industries, as well as important
areas in foreign trade and investment. In labor relations, the most pressing
social issue of the time, "control" served as the basic factor in the
"integrated enterprise" doctrine adopted by administrative gloss to provide
much of the basic framework for the regulatory program. This American
model of statutory enterprise law has spread throughout the developed
world. Thus, in its key regulatory areas, the European Union has widely
utilized the concept of "control." Reliance on the doctrine is also evident
to a much lesser extent in the statutory law of numerous European national
governments as well.
In those statutory areas where the Congress had utilized the concept
of "control", resort to "piercing the veil" to reach affiliated companies of
the group was no longer necessary. However, in other areas of statutory
law, the fundamental jurisprudential problem remained.
Faced with unrealistic consequences arising from application of the
conventional "piercing doctrine", federal courts became less ready to
apply the traditional form of "piercing" that had evolved in the
adjudication of controversies between private parties in the statutory areas
where public considerations were paramount. Many courts broadened
their approach. They became readier to apply enterprise principles and
disregard traditional entity concepts when required in order to implement
the underlying statutory objectives and policies and to prevent evasion and
frustration of regulatory programs.
This development has taken a number of forms. Many courts turned
from traditional corporation law and the literal reading of statutes. They
reached enterprise results through "broad" or "liberal" construction to
remedial legislation. Even when courts turned to "piercing", they ignored
its limitations by evoking a much looser version of the doctrine observing
that public interests, rather than private controversies, were concerned.
This is a spotty and uneven development, but it is indicative of the extent
of judicial frustration with entity law and "piercing the veil" when vital
public interests are at stake.
1999]
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In common-law areas involving private controversies, traditional
corporation law and "piercing the veil jurisprudence" has retained much
greater vitality. Even here, however, in tort cases particularly, courts in an
impressive number of cases have imposed liability on parent corporations
while employing the conventional "piercing" doctrine. Although this is
not the usual result, it happens often enough to make "piercing" an issue in
most tort litigation.
In an interesting variety of areas, courts have also turned to other
approaches in order to reach an enterprise result where enterprise
principles rather than entity principles better implemented the underlying
objectives of the law in the area. These alternative approaches have taken
a number of forms of varying significance that have been applied in
numerous areas.
Perhaps, the most used route to enterprise liability in common law
matters has been the broadening or liberalization of conventional concepts.
This has occurred in the field of jurisdiction reinforced by the "stream of
commerce" doctrine. It has also occurred in other areas in procedure
including claim and issue preclusion and discovery through the concept of
"control"; in agency law giving rise to a body of law that may well be
described as quasi-agency law; in apparent agency in particular in such
areas as franchising and integrated health care enterprises; and in tort law
with such familiar developments as product liability and non-delegable
duty.
Product liability is a doctrine with a much broader objective than
dealing solely with the issues arising with respect to parent and subsidiary
corporations. In its comprehensive sweep applying the philosophy of
enterprise liability, it renders superfluous the need to rely on "piercing the
veil" for imposition of liability in product liability matters when parent
and subsidiaries are involved.
Other doctrines of varying importance in different areas include the
liberalization or expansion of conventional concepts. This is occurring in
jurisdictions reinforced by the "stream of commerce" doctrine; in certain
areas in procedure including claim and issue preclusion and discovery; in
agency law giving rise to a body of law that may well be described as
quasi-agency law; in apparent agency especially in such areas as
franchising and integrated health care enterprises; and in tort law with
such concepts as product liability and non-delegable duty.
In sum, the doctrine of the separate corporate entity in many areas in
statutory law, in important areas of procedure, and in some areas of
common law has yielded to the increasing acceptance of enterprise
principles. This comprises the American law of corporate groups, a
substantial body of jurisprudence that represents the struggle of American
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jurisprudence to adapt doctrinal concepts formulated centuries ago in a
very different society to the contemporary world of multinational
corporate groups of enormous size and incredible complexity.

